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PATENT LAW—BRINGING PREDICTABILITY BACK WITH THE 
INTRACIRCUIT SPLIT PRONOUNCED IN RETRACTABLE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. 
BECTON, DICKINSON & CO., 653 F.3D 1296 (FED. CIR. 2011): CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION AND UNPREDICTABLY LIMITING THE PATENTEE’S RIGHTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the rapidly expanding entrepreneurial world of biotechnology, an 
up-and-coming medical student at UAMS has recently secured a patent on a 
precision laser device, which she will dedicate her life to developing, which 
will revolutionize how doctors treat and eliminate cancerous tumors. In-
spired by the loss of a close family member to cancer, she has been develop-
ing this cancer-killing device since taking Robotics in her junior year of 
college. Two years after securing the patent and during the testing phase of 
her invention, she discovers that without her consent her former lab partner 
copied her design, reprinted her notes, and stole her idea. He secretly cloned 
and then modified the device, and now he seeks to secure a patent of his 
own. She knows that he is guilty of patent infringement, and she wants to 
protect her legal rights, including the rights to exclusively market, produce, 
license, and distribute the invention. 
After consulting an attorney, she learns that her previous patent attor-
ney, who compiled and secured the patent, used ambiguous language in con-
structing the necessary components of the patent. The new attorney tells her 
that when certain language of the patent is ambiguous or unclear, the court 
can be unpredictable in its determination of what constitutes the patentable 
invention and thus what infringes upon that patent. At this point, she is not 
sure what the court will consider to be her patented device or her legal rights 
because the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal 
Circuit”) is not uniform in its methodology of analyzing ambiguous patent 
language. The unpredictability and lack of uniformity leave her with more 
questions than answers, and she wonders if pursuing litigation will even 
render her the best results. 
There is no denying that patents can be very arduous and complex. 
Generally speaking, there are three primary parts of a patent: the specifica-
tion, the drawings, and the claims.1 The claims and specification are the two 
primary components relevant to this note. A patent must conclude with at 
least one claim, which is a single sentence description that identifies the 
 
 1 1 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 1:21 (2008). 
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invention over which the patentee wants legal rights and exclusivity.2 The 
single sentence of a claim identifies exactly what the patentee regards as 
“its” own invention. The specification “includes drawings and textual de-
scriptions of the invention” and describes the “embodiments of the inven-
tion,” which are specific blueprints to build and use the invention.3 Thus, the 
specifications provide a step-by-step description and illustration of what the 
invention looks like, how it is constructed, and how it is used. The claims 
are single sentences that identify exactly what the patentee seeks to establish 
legal rights over.4 When the words within the claims, the claim terms, are 
ambiguous, the court will analyze the varying evidence in order to deter-
mine the meaning of the claim term; this is claim construction.5 Simply, 
claim construction can be thought of as being analogous to statutory inter-
pretation because both require interpretation of ambiguous language where 
reasonable minds can reach very different conclusions. 
The Federal Circuit is the appellate court of focus in this note regarding 
matters of patent litigation on appeal. Although the Federal Circuit was cre-
ated to provide predictability and uniformity, the court can be unpredictable 
and lack uniformity in the methodology used in claim construction, which 
can leave a patentee wondering exactly what rights he may have over his 
patent.6 Predictability and uniformity have been well-known goals and ob-
jectives in the creation and interpretation of law throughout history. The 
Federal Courts Improvement Act created the Federal Circuit with the goal of 
establishing uniformity in patent law interpretation, including claim con-
struction.7 
Despite efforts to establish uniformity in the Federal Circuit, there has 
been substantial uncertainty and unpredictability in claim construction with-
in the Federal Circuit.8 According to a 2001 study by Judge Kimberly 
Moore, now a judge in the Federal Circuit, the district courts have decided at 
least one claim construction issue incorrectly in 33% of appealed cases, and 
the Federal Circuit reversed or vacated the decision in 81% of cases where 
the district court’s claim construction reached an incorrect conclusion.9 This 
is a huge percentage of reversed and vacated judgments handed down from 
a district court. Because the Federal Circuit has not established and adhered 
 
 2. Christopher A. Cotropia, What is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 
1865 (2012). 
 3. Id. at 1866. 
 4. Id. at 1865. 
 5. See id. at 1865–66, 1879. 
 6. See Eifion Phillips, Comment, Phillips v. AWH Corp.: Reemphasizing Context in 
Patent Claim Construction, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 957, 958–59 (2006). 
 7. Id. at 958. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11–13 (2001). 
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to one specific methodology, patent litigants have faced extremely high re-
versal rates in the Federal Circuit, purportedly up to 47% in 2003–2004.10 
Many argue that the particular claim construction methodology the 
court employs in any given case depends largely on which judges are on the 
panel and which ones are not, making it panel-dependent and very unpre-
dictable.11 Moreover, when claim construction is not certain or definite, even 
in the Federal Circuit, there is greater unpredictability and uncertainty that 
can dictate how a person chooses to pursue infringement litigation and the 
chances of success.12 Claim construction appeals can “lead[] to frustrating 
and unpredictable results” for all parties involved, leaving litigants wonder-
ing exactly what rights they have over their patents and how the court will 
construe their patents in litigation.13 
This note examines the claim construction methodologies of the Feder-
al Circuit as pronounced in the intracircuit split of Retractable Technolo-
gies., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.14 (“Retractable I”) and Retractable 
Technologies., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.15 (“Retractable II”), as well 
as the role of the specification in claim construction. The majority in Re-
tractable I appears to transgress the precedent and guidelines of claim con-
struction as promulgated by Phillips v. AWH Corp.16 (“Phillips”).17 The dis-
sents in Retractable I and II assert that the majority deviated from its estab-
lished method of claim construction and its approach cannot be reconciled 
with Phillips.18 Phillips established that within the rules of claim construc-
tion, the specification should not be used to import a limitation into the 
claim term, but the specification should be used to interpret the meaning of a 
claim term.19 The dissent in Retractable I maintains that the majority im-
properly used the specification to import a limitation into the claim term, 
 
 10. Phillips, supra note 6, at 959. 
 11. Stephanie Ann Yonker, Post-Phillips Claim Construction: Questions Unresolved, 47 
IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 301, 308–09 (2007). 
 12. See Moore, supra note 9, at 27–28. 
 13. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (noting the frequent 
commentary, discussion, and analysis of the unpredictability and lack of uniformity in claim 
construction appeals). 
 14. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 15. Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d 1369 (denial of rehearing en banc). 
 16. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (establishing guidelines for conducting 
claim construction). 
 17. Compare Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1303–13, with Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–
20. 
 18. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1370–73 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable 
Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
 19. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. 
336 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
thereby deviating from the guidelines of Phillips and limiting the rights of 
the patentee.20 
This note shows that the majority in Retractable I erred when it deviat-
ed from the well-established guidelines of Phillips and improperly and un-
predictably limited the rights of the patentee. The dissent in Retractable I 
and the majority in Phillips adhere to the correct claim construction meth-
odology, and in order to increase predictability and uniformity, the Federal 
Circuit should adhere to the claim construction methodology promulgated 
by Phillips and avoid deviation from those guidelines. Compounding the 
problem, the Federal Circuit reviews claim construction appeals de novo as 
a matter of law, granting zero deference to the lower court, even when fac-
tual-based extrinsic evidence is utilized, and the lower court is better 
equipped to analyze large amounts of factual based evidence.21 
As essential background information, this note first examines the pur-
pose of a patent, the relevant components of a patent, and the establishment 
and role of the Federal Circuit. Next, the note discusses the claim construc-
tion process and standards of Phillips and the intracircuit split of Retractable 
I and Phillips. This note then explains the concept of extrinsic versus intrin-
sic evidence, as well as the Federal Circuit’s de novo review of claim con-
struction matters. In conclusion, the note analyzes the intracircuit split by 
comparing and contrasting methodologies, established standards, extrinsic 
evidence, and it concludes that the majority in Retractable I erred when it 
deviated from the standards of Phillips by improperly using the specification 
to limit the meaning of a claim term, which leads to unpredictable conse-
quences for patent litigants. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section begins by exploring the purpose of a patent, the compo-
nents, and the Federal Circuit as the appellate court of focus. Next, this sec-
tion explains claim construction, the standards of claim construction used by 
the Federal Circuit, and the intracircuit split of claim construction method-
ology. Finally, this section shows that the courts should use extrinsic evi-
dence when the intrinsic evidentiary record is inconclusive to resolve a 
claim term ambiguity. 
 
 20. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1311–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
 21. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1370–73 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable 
Techs., 653 F.3d at 131–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
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A. What a Patent Represents, the Purpose, the Components, and the Fed-
eral Circuit 
In the United States, a patent confers upon the patentee certain legal 
rights that are established to help protect the patented invention.22 Recall 
previously that the specification is composed of drawings and textual de-
scriptions that provide a blueprint on how to duplicate the invention.23 The 
specification is analogous to a food recipe in a cookbook that shows step-
by-step how to reproduce and use the invention. The claims of a patent are 
single-sentence descriptions that conclude the specification and identify the 
invention and exactly what the patentee is claiming to have rights over.24 
During patent litigation and prosecution for infringement, the court must 
determine the specific rights that encompass the patent in order to determine 
if those rights have been infringed upon.25 Upon appeal from the federal 
district courts, the Federal Circuit is the primary appellate court and the 
court of focus in this note.26 
1. The Purpose of a Patent  
It is important to understand the necessity and significance of a patent 
and its purpose because patents serve to confer on the patentee certain legal 
rights to exclusively develop, produce, sell, market, distribute, license, and 
provide an incentive to disclose “new scientific and technical develop-
ments.”27 Patents also serve to encourage innovation and development by 
protecting the rights of the patentee from infringement by outside sources 
such as duplication, reproduction, or modification.28 The protection of a pa-
tentee’s rights encourages innovation by protecting the fruits of the patent-
ee’s labor from infringement and exploitation.29 Patents seek to “foster and 
reward invention,” “promote[] disclosure of inventions,” and “assure that 
ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.”30 
Inventors, researchers, developers, investors, and academics need reas-
surance and confidence that their inventions and developments will be pro-
 
 22. See generally Cotropia, supra note 2. 
 23. Id. at 1866. 
 24. Id. at 1865; Christian E. Mammen, Patent Claim Construction as a Form of Legal 
Interpretation, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 40, 44 (2012). 
 25. See generally Cotropia, supra note 2. 
 26. Mammen, supra note 24, at 51. 
 27. 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1:2 (2d ed. 
2015). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (quoting Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 
1998)). 
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tected from infringement.31 In order to foster and encourage research, devel-
opment, and innovation, the United States must have a system of laws and 
protections that affords these assurances.32 The purpose of United States 
patent law is to ensure that a person who has invested time, energy, money, 
and labor in developing a patentable product or process should be afforded 
the benefit of that invention by having the legal right to exclude others from 
the benefit of that invention.33 
2. The Relevant Components of a Patent: Specification and Claims 
The two main, and most relevant, parts of a patent are the claim and the 
specification.34 As previously discussed, a patent must end with at least one 
claim, which is a single sentence that identifies the invention over which the 
patentee wants legal rights and exclusivity.35 Also, the specification “in-
cludes drawings and textual descriptions of the invention” and describes the 
“embodiments of the invention,” which can be used as a blueprint to build 
and use the invention.36 
The requirement of one or more claims and the specification are statu-
tory requirements that, pursuant to established law, must be included in eve-
ry patent.37 Statute 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) establishes the requirement that a 
written specification must use “clear, concise, and exact terms” such that 
“any person skilled in the art to which it pertains” can make and use the 
same invention with the understanding of the meaning.38 Section 112(b) 
requires the specification to conclude with one or more claims, which will 
identify precisely what the inventor regards as the invention.39 Thus, this 
statute requires a specification as well as one or more claims to identify in 
clear and concise terms what the inventor seeks to enforce legal rights and 
exclusivity over, and what is regarded as the invention.40 
3. The Role and Establishment of the Federal Circuit 
Claim language and specifications can be difficult, technical, and ex-
tremely complex to dissect and analyze.41 Because of the specialization and 
 
 31. See generally Phillips, supra note 6, at 957, 979. 
 32. See id. at 979. 
 33. MILLS ET AL., supra note 27, § 1:2. 
 34. See Cotropia, supra note 2, at 1865–66. 
 35. Id. at 1865. 
 36. Id. at 1866. 
 37. 35 U.S.C § 112(a)–(b) (2013). 
 38. Id. § 112(a). 
 39. Id. § 112(b). 
 40. Id. § 112(a)–(b). 
 41. See generally Cotropia, supra note 2. 
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technical aspect of patent infringement and claim construction, not every 
court has jurisdiction over issues of patent law, specifically over patent in-
fringement.42 Congress created the Federal Circuit, through the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, in order to provide an appellate forum 
having exclusive jurisdiction specifically over patent law.43 The Federal 
Circuit, therefore, serves as the exclusive appellate court for matters of pa-
tent law and patent cases when appealed from a federal district court.44 The 
Federal Circuit will ultimately hear matters of patent infringement on appeal 
regarding patent claim construction, and is the court of focus in this note.45 
B. When the Claim Term is Ambiguous: The Standard of Claim Construc-
tion and the Intracircuit Split 
A patent infringement case on appeal requires the court to analyze and 
interpret the claims and the specification in order to determine the patentee’s 
precise legal rights and whether those rights have been infringed.46 When the 
claim term or language is unambiguous, the court need not engage in further 
analysis for that particular claim.47 However, when the claim term is ambig-
uous the court is required to engage in claim construction analysis in order 
to determine what legal rights that claim will confer upon the patentee.48 
Claim construction is the particular analysis that the court will undertake in 
order to interpret and define the particular meaning of claim terms and claim 
language.49 Phillips represents the Federal Circuit’s well-established guide-
lines of claim construction.50  
1. Phillips v. AWH Corp. Sets the Standard for Claim Construction 
Methodology 
Phillips sets the standard and guidelines for claim construction analysis 
and provides a roadmap of how the court is to engage in claim construction 
in order to provide uniformity and predictability.51 In Phillips, the court in-
 
 42. See Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit Under § 1295(A)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651, 651–52 (2002). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Edward D. Manzo, How to Improve Patent Claim Interpretations, 22 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 203, 204–13 (2012). 
 47. See id. at 203–12. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Manzo, supra note 46, 203–212. 
 50. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 51. See id. 
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terpreted, established, and reiterated all of the rules and guidelines to be 
followed in conducting claim construction.52  
The claims of a patent define the invention and what the patentee has a 
legal right to exclude others from using.53 This principle has been recog-
nized since 1836, when Congress first required that a specification include 
one or more claims.54 Phillips states that the words contained in a claim “are 
generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” when reading a pa-
tent.55 The ordinary and customary meaning of a term in patent law is “the 
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in 
question at the time of the invention.”56 The person of ordinary skill through 
whose eyes the claim is construed—persons skilled in the field of the inven-
tion—must read the claim term in the context of the whole patent, including 
the specification.57 However, the meaning of the claim term under these 
guidelines may not be readily apparent, and the court then looks to other 
sources to determine the meaning of the claim term.58 The court may look to 
the words of the claims themselves, claim language, or the remainder of the 
specification, all of which constitute intrinsic evidence.59 When the intrinsic 
evidentiary record is insufficient to determine the meaning of the claim term 
or language, the court may then look to extrinsic evidence, including expert 
testimony, the dictionary meaning of terms, and prior trial court hearings 
and proceedings, for example.60 
The specification plays an important role, because claims do not stand 
alone and must be analyzed and interpreted in view of the specification in 
order to ascertain the whole written instrument.61 In fact, the specification is 
highly relevant, and when the claim term is disputed, the specification is 
usually dispositive in claim construction analysis, but not always.62 
When the specification is not dispositive but is unclear or ambiguous, 
the court must engage in claim construction to determine the whole meaning 
 
 52. See id. at 1311–24. 
 53. Id. at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 
F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979–81 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582) (citing Toro Co. v. White Consol. 
Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per 
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 56. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (citations omitted). 
 57. Id. at 1313 (citations omitted). 
 58. See id. at 1314 (citations omitted). 
 59. See id. at 1313–15 (citations omitted). 
 60. See id. at 1317–19 (citations omitted). 
 61. See id. at 1315. 
 62. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
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of the written instrument.63 The purpose of the specification is to enable oth-
ers skilled in the art to make and use the invention, that is, to essentially 
provide a blueprint of the invention.64 In cases of ambiguity, case law pre-
scribes that the court should refer to the descriptive portion of the specifica-
tion to ascertain the meaning of the claim term.65 
In claim construction, the court seeks to determine the “scope of the ac-
tual invention” by analyzing the context of the patent as a whole rather than 
“divorcing the claim language from the specification.”66 The court considers 
the specification as a guideline in construing the claim term when determin-
ing the scope of the actual invention; that is, the claim term should not be 
interpreted to mean something that the specification does not support.67 
However, it is essential to understand that there is an important “dis-
tinction between using the specification to interpret the meaning of a claim 
and importing limitations from the specification into the claim.”68 This quot-
ed language means that the specification should not be used to improperly 
limit the meaning of the claim term, but rather it should only be used for the 
purpose of interpreting the meaning of a claim term. For example, if a claim 
term in the precision laser device is written as a “laser refractor” and the 
specification describes a “two-piece laser refractor,” the claim term should 
not be limited in its interpretation to include only a “two-piece laser refrac-
tor” because that would import a limitation from the specification into the 
claim term. The claim term should not be limited to the exact description or 
embodiments of the specification.69 The specification is not to be used as 
limiting language but rather as a helpful tool in construing a claim.70 Previ-
ous case law concludes that the court must focus on understanding what a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the claim to mean and re-
frain from confining the meaning of a claim term to the specific embodi-
ments described by the specification.71 
 
 63. See id. at 1315. 
 64. See id. at 1323 (citing Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 
(Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 65. Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 38 (1878). 
 66. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323–24. 
 67. See id. at 1320–24. 
 68. Id. at 1323 (citing Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186–87 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 69. Id. (citing Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906–08 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002); SRI Int’l 
v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. (citing Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc., 403 F.3d at 1369; Liebel-Flarsheim Co., 358 
F.3d at 906–08; Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1327; SRI Int’l, 775 F.2d at 1121). 
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This means that the claim term should not be limited strictly to what 
the specification describes.72 Improperly importing a limitation diminishes 
the patentee’s rights, restricts her patented invention, and increases unpre-
dictability by creating unintended consequences. In order to avoid importing 
limitations from the specification into the claim, the court should adhere to 
the notion that the purpose of the specification is to teach a person of ordi-
nary skill in the art how to make and use the invention, not to provide limi-
tations upon the claim term.73 This is a very important distinction and is the 
crux of this note’s analysis. Retractable I, II, and Phillips represent an in-
tracircuit split in which the dissents in Retractable I and II alleged that the 
majority improperly imported a limitation from the specification into the 
claim term, thereby deviating from the guidelines of Phillips.74 This devia-
tion defies the standards set forth by Phillips. 
2. The Intracircuit Split: Claim Construction Methodology in Re-
tractable I and the Dissents in Retractable I and II, and Whether a 
Limitation was Improperly Imported—Background Case Law  
Retractable I, Retractable II, and Phillips are the primary cases at hand 
in examining the ambiguity in a claim term, claim construction, and the in-
tracircuit split. In Retractable I, Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD), 
referencing patented retractable syringe needles, argued that the claim term 
“body” as a central housing of a syringe needle (the part of the needle that 
contains any liquids to be injected) should be restricted to include only one-
piece bodies.75 BD argued that the district court erred in construing the term 
“body” as not limited to a single-piece structure and finding that the term 
can include multiple-piece bodies.76 Retractable Technologies, Inc. (RTI) 
countered that the ordinary meaning of “body” does not limit the term to a 
one-piece structure.77 According to RTI, the use of the modifier “one-piece” 
in specific instances indicated that the “body” was not intended to be exclu-
sively one-piece but could contain multiple pieces; otherwise, the modifying 
term “one-piece” would have been superfluous.78 The Federal Circuit agreed 
 
 72. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See generally Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson 
& Co., 653 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Phillips, 415 F.3d 1303. 
 75. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1298–1300, 1304. 
 76. See id. at 1304. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
2015] BRINGING PREDICTABILITY BACK 343 
with BD that the term “body” is limited to a one-piece structure when 
viewed in light of the specification.79 
The majority in Retractable I asserted that a court must view the claim 
language in light of the specification to determine the proper construction of 
the term.80 The construction of the term “body” being limited to a “one-
piece body is required to tether the claims to what the specifications indicate 
the inventor actually invented” because the specifications show the body 
constructed as a single structure and only disclose embodiments that are 
limited to a single-piece body.81 The majority limited the claim term to one 
piece not by construing the term itself but by viewing the term in light of the 
specification in order to “capture the scope of the actual invention.”82 
The dissent argued that the majority improperly imported a limitation 
from the specification into the claim term, which improperly limited the 
rights of the patentee, RTI.83 The dissent in Retractable I (and Retractable 
II), recognizing Phillips as the standard for claim construction methodology, 
asserted that the claims themselves, not the specification, define the inven-
tion.84 The dissent believed that the term “body” and the claim language 
were ambiguous and reiterated that the “[c]laim language is to be given its 
ordinary . . . meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the 
art.”85 In support of the dissents, the court in Phillips held that the court must 
not improperly import a limitation from the specification into the claim but 
should only construe the claim in light of the specification.86 
There is clear disagreement in determining if the majority improperly 
imported a limitation into the claim term and whether the claim construction 
in this case violated the guidelines of claim construction set forth in Phil-
lips.87 This is significant because if the majority in Retractable I did in fact 
use the specification to limit the meaning of the claim, thereby violating the 
rules of Phillips, then the patentee’s legal rights were improperly limited as 
well. Based upon the methodology established by Phillips, the court should 
 
 79. Id. at 1305. 
 80. Id. at 1305 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
banc)). 
 81. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305. 
 82. See id. at 1304–05. 
 83. See id. at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
 84. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370–71 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 
1312); Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 415 
F.3d at 1312). 
 85. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 415 
F.3d at 1312–13). 
 86. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. 
 87. See generally Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d 1369 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable 
Techs., 653 F.3d 1296 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
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not use the specification to limit the meaning of a claim term, and the Feder-
al Circuit is split in determining if Retractable I represents a deviation from 
that methodology. Deviation from precedential methodology introduces and 
compounds the element of unpredictability for patent litigants. 
Parallel with the dissent in Retractable I, the dissenting opinion in Re-
tractable II illustrated the intracircuit split regarding claim construction 
methodology and the role of the specification. The judges here explicitly 
acknowledged the existence of an intracircuit split in claim construction 
methodology and the role of the specification.88 The dissenting judges de-
clared that the majority decision in Retractable I cannot be reconciled with 
Phillips and that Retractable I deviated from the claim construction meth-
odology promulgated in Phillips.89 
This split affirms the notion that the Federal Circuit is not uniform or 
predictable in its methodology of claim construction as promulgated by the 
guidelines of Phillips. This lack of uniformity and predictability can have 
grave consequences for both parties in a patent infringement case in deter-
mining the legal rights of each party and what constitutes the patented in-
vention. Improperly importing a limitation into a claim term will degrade 
predictability and uniformity because the patented rights will be improperly 
limited. It is paramount that predictability and uniformity be material goals 
in both the creation and interpretation of law. 
C. When the Intrinsic Evidentiary Record is Inconclusive, Extrinsic Evi-
dence is Needed 
In conducting claim construction analysis, the court first looks to the 
intrinsic evidentiary record consisting of claim language and the specifica-
tion to construe the meaning of a claim term.90 However, the intrinsic record 
is not always conclusive or dispositive in resolving ambiguity, and the court 
can look to the extrinsic evidentiary record as a tool in claim construction 
analysis, such as expert testimony, prior hearings, documentary evidence, 
etc.91 Extrinsic evidence has an inherently factual component for which the 
Federal Circuit’s standard of appellate review is de novo, granting zero def-
erence to the lower court even on matters of factual inquiry.92  
 
 88. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1373 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 89. See id. at 1371–72. 
 90. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17. 
 91. See id. at 1317–19. 
 92. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1374–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (reviewing 
extrinsic evidence is factual in nature). 
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It is improper to use extrinsic evidence in the claim construction analy-
sis when the intrinsic evidence alone resolves an ambiguity.93 The trial 
court, and the Federal Circuit, will only look to the extrinsic evidentiary 
record if ambiguity exists after analyzing the intrinsic record to construe a 
claim.94 When the claim language is still ambiguous after analyzing the in-
trinsic evidentiary record, extrinsic evidence can be useful in determining 
the whole meaning of claim language; however, it is second to intrinsic evi-
dence in the hierarchy.95 
Comparatively, intrinsic evidence is more reliable because it is first-
hand, primary evidence written into the patent.96 Although useful, extrinsic 
evidence is not part of the patent and is not created for the purpose of ex-
pounding on the patent’s scope.97 Extrinsic evidence might not be written by 
or directed towards a person skilled in the field of the patent and thus may 
not reflect the understanding of the skilled artisan.98 Moreover, extrinsic 
evidence can also suffer from bias that intrinsic evidence is not subject to, 
because extrinsic evidence may be generated for the specific purpose of 
patent litigation.99 Although it can be useful, extrinsic evidence cannot be 
used to change or contradict the claim language itself or the specification; it 
can only help in understanding the meaning of the claim terms, and when 
the claim is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence should be given no weight.100 
Phillips established intrinsic evidence as the most important source of evi-
dence used in claim construction, while finding that extrinsic evidence is 
secondary.101 
III. ANALYSIS 
The holder and owner of a patent must know the exact legal rights he 
or she possesses over his or her invention when patent infringement is al-
leged. This is especially true in cases of patent infringement where the pa-
tentee’s legal rights may determine whether or not an outside party has in-
 
 93. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing 
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Hormone Re-
search Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 94. See id. at 1584. 
 95. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317–19. 
 96. See id. at 1313–18. 
 97. Id. at 1318. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (cit-
ing Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Markman 
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979–81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
 101. See THE LITIG. COMM. OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N OF CHI., CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1:8 (Edward D. Manzo ed., 2012). 
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fringed upon those rights. It is imperative that the patentee and the patent 
attorney be able to adequately predict how the court will construe the claim 
language and terms. Unpredictability and lack of uniformity exist when the 
court is split on how to properly construe a claim term, and where zero def-
erence is given to the lower court on matters of factual inquiry involving 
extrinsic evidence. Claim construction utilizing extrinsic evidence is at least 
partly a factual inquiry, and by granting zero deference to the lower court on 
these factual inquiries, the Federal Circuit creates more unpredictability and 
a lack of uniformity. Deviating from established claim construction guide-
lines increases the unpredictability of patent claim construction appeals to 
the Federal Circuit, which is contrary to the purpose of establishing predict-
ability in patent litigation. 
A.  De Novo Review Utilizing Extrinsic Evidence Compounds the Unpre-
dictability 
If claim construction utilizing extrinsic evidence consists of sufficient 
factual inquiry so as to make claim construction a mixed question of law and 
fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that deference should be given to the 
lower court on mixed questions of law and fact.102 Judge O’Malley, in the 
Retractable II dissent, recognized that claim construction using extrinsic 
evidence requires a factual inquiry and consists of an inherently factual 
component.103 Because extrinsic evidence can be extensive, including prior 
testimony and hearings sometimes extending for several days, the trial court 
is better equipped to acquire and evaluate such massive amounts of evi-
dence.104 Analyzing and utilizing extensive documentary evidence sounds 
much more like a factual inquiry than a legal inquiry.105 The court must rec-
ognize the obvious factual inquiry rather than brushing it off as a question of 
law and affording no deference to the lower court.106 There is clearly a fac-
tual component of claim construction when using extrinsic evidence, be-
cause extrinsic evidence itself contains factual components.107 
By not recognizing the factual component of claim construction when 
using extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit exacerbates the problem of 
unpredictability by granting zero deference to the lower court, which is usu-
 
 102. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (citing Salve Regina Col-
lege v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)). 
 103. See id. at 1374–76. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. at 1375–76. 
 106. See id. at 1373–76. 
 107. See id. at 1374–76. 
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ally more equipped to determine questions of fact.108 In Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Technologies, Inc.,109 the Federal Circuit held that claim construction is 
purely a matter of law and is reviewed de novo on appeal, which includes 
any fact-based questions or inquiries.110 In affirming this decision, the Fed-
eral Circuit looked to the Supreme Court decision in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc. (“Markman II”),111 which held that claim construction is 
purely a matter of law to be decided by a judge, not a jury.112 The decision in 
Cybor effectively abrogated any prior decisions or language purporting that 
claim construction is a mixed question of law and fact and set in stone the 
notion that claim construction is purely a matter of law to be reviewed on 
appeal de novo.113 
However, there is much argument and debate surrounding the assertion 
that claim construction is purely a matter of law that resulted from Cybor, 
even within the Federal Circuit.114 Many scholars, professors, lawyers, and 
even Federal Circuit judges believe that claim construction contains ele-
ments of factual inquiry, especially when considering extrinsic evidence, 
and this postulation brings into question the issue of de novo review of fac-
tual inquiry.115 Patent law expert, Professor Peter S. Menell of U.C. Berke-
ley School of Law, argues that the Federal Circuit erroneously concluded, in 
Cybor, that claim construction matters must be reviewed de novo regardless 
of any factual underpinnings.116 Professor Menell asserts that the court mis-
apprehended the mixed fact and law nature of claim construction as being 
purely a matter of law and concludes that there is a factual inquiry involved 
in claim construction that must be recognized.117 This means that the court 
must recognize the factual nature of claim construction when extrinsic evi-
dence is involved. 
The review and analysis of extrinsic evidence contains matters of fac-
tual inquiry because it looks beyond the patent to outside sources, which are 
inherently fact based.118 Nonetheless, even against much disagreement and 
dissent from the legal world, the Federal Circuit continues to review matters 
 
 108. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1374–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 109. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 110. Id. at 1456. 
 111. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 112. See id. at 372; Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1451 (citing Markman, 517 U.S. 370). 
 113. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1456. 
 114. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373–76 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See Brief of Professor Peter S. Menell as Amicus Curiae Supporting Lighting Ballast 
Control LLC at 2–3, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 500 F. 
App’x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Nos. 2012–1014, 2012–1015) [hereinafter Menell]. 
 117. See id. at 2–6. 
 118. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1374–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
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of claim construction de novo per Cybor.119 This means that even in matters 
of claim construction where extrinsic evidence is utilized to construct the 
claim language, the Federal Circuit reviews the matter de novo with zero 
deference to the lower court, and the lower court is often more capable and 
better equipped to analyze and review such vast amounts of factual evi-
dence.120 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that courts must use a 
deferential standard of review when reviewing mixed questions of law and 
fact.121 Giving zero deference to the lower court on factual matters of claim 
construction fosters unpredictability and a lack of uniformity in conjunction 
with the intracircuit split on proper claim construction methodology. 
Many in the legal community argue that claim construction is one area 
where the Federal Circuit has erroneously treated factual matters of claim 
construction as questions of law.122 The evaluation and review of extrinsic 
evidence seems to be a factual inquiry, at least in part, and not solely a ques-
tion of law because much of extrinsic evidence consists of matters of fact 
and factual components.123 Judge Mayer of the Federal Circuit asserts that 
claim construction is not devoid of any factual component, but rather claim 
construction inherently contains matters of factual inquiry.124 Claim con-
struction, particularly when reviewing extrinsic evidence, requires questions 
and inquiries of fact because of the factual nature of extrinsic evidence such 
as prior hearings and expert testimony.125 Professor Peter S. Menell recog-
nizes that extrinsic evidence is inherently factual in nature, which under-
mines the notion that claim construction is a pure question of law; rather 
there is indeed a factual component.126 
The problem lies in the fact that the Federal Circuit grants zero defer-
ence to the district court on matters of claim construction involving the 
analysis and interpretation of extrinsic evidence, which contains factual 
components.127 Judge Moore of the Federal Circuit stated that the Federal 
 
 119. See id. at 1373–76. 
 120. See id.; Menell, supra note 116, at 2–3. 
 121. Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1374 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (citing Salve Regina 
College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)). 
 122. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1791, 1831–33 (2013). 
 123. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1375–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting); Gugliuzza, 
supra note 122, at 1832. 
 124. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330–34 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
(Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 125. See id. at 1332. 
 126. See Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and 
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 726 (2010) (explaining that claim 
construction is not a pure question of law and when extrinsic evidence is being introduced 
into the analysis, the inquiry becomes a factual inquiry). 
 127. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1331–34 (Mayer, J., dissenting); Gugliuzza, supra note 
122, at 1832–34. 
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Circuit is not well suited to review issues of factual determinations without 
giving deference to the lower court.128 The court’s decision in Cybor to re-
gard all claim construction matters as questions of law reviewed with zero 
deference “was ill considered . . . and has not proven ‘beneficial.’”129 In fact, 
the district court is better equipped than the Federal Circuit and it has the 
tools to evaluate large amounts of extrinsic evidence.130 The Federal Circuit 
compounds the unpredictability and lack of uniformity in appellate claim 
construction matters because the lower court is given zero deference on 
what appear to be mixed questions of law and fact.131 The dissent in Re-
tractable II and many commentators recognize the mixed question of law 
and fact inherent in claim construction using extrinsic evidence, and by 
granting zero deference to the lower court, the Federal Circuit may exclude 
or give a disproportionate weight to the extrinsic evidence and come to a 
different conclusion than the district court.132 
The conclusions drawn by the Federal Circuit from claim construction 
using extrinsic evidence may be very different than the conclusions drawn 
by a district court. When the district court is better positioned to handle 
large amounts of extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit should give its con-
clusions weight and deference because that will help provide uniformity and 
increase the predictability of patent litigation. A scenario where the Federal 
Circuit reaches a completely different result and conclusion than a district 
court upon the review of extrinsic evidence further increases the unpredicta-
bility of claim construction. 
On the other hand, Douglas Y’Barbo argues that conclusions reached 
from the extrinsic evidence are in fact entitled to deference by the Federal 
Circuit and the Federal Circuit does not review district courts’ conclusions 
drawn from extrinsic evidence de novo.133 However, this assertion directly 
defies Cybor, which stated that claim construction is a matter of law that is 
reviewed without deference to district court conclusions, even when extrin-
sic evidence is considered in the district court’s conclusion.134 Cybor does 
not carve out an exception for deference when extrinsic evidence is utilized 
 
 128. Moore, supra note 9, at 16. 
 129. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Plager, J., concurring)). 
 130. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1477 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part); Douglas Y’Barbo,  Is Extrinsic Evidence Ever Necessary to Decide Claim Construction 
Disputes? Part II, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 101, 102 (2000). 
 131. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1373–75 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 132. See id. at 1370, 1373 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 133. See Y’Barbo, supra note 130, at 103. 
 134. See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1455–56. 
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and analyzed by the district court in reaching its conclusion, which rebuts 
Mr. Y’Barbo’s conclusion.135 
As an example, in the case of Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-
Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., the Federal Circuit reached a different conclusion 
than the district court based upon the extrinsic evidentiary record.136 In es-
sence, the Federal Circuit granted zero deference to the district court and 
disagreed with its interpretation of the extrinsic evidentiary record even 
though the lower court is better equipped to interpret extrinsic evidence.137 
The patent litigants in this case likely did not predict that the Federal Circuit 
would reach a completely different conclusion than the district court. The 
district court was likely in a better position to review and analyze the extrin-
sic evidentiary record in construing the claim. 
The Federal Circuit could have generated a more predictable outcome 
by granting some deference to the lower court on factual matters that exist in 
claim construction with extrinsic evidence. Although the Federal Circuit 
would not always reach the same conclusion as the district court, the grant-
ing of some deference would decrease the extraordinarily high reversal rate 
for which the Federal Circuit is notorious. It stands to reason that because 
the district court is presented with vast amounts of extrinsic evidence inter-
twined with factual inquiry, the Federal Circuit should grant some deference 
to the lower court. This deference would increase predictability by ensuring 
that the Federal Circuit takes into account the district court’s ability to better 
handle large amounts of factual evidence, and thereby decrease the high 
reversal rate. If the conclusions drawn by the Federal Circuit hinge on the 
utilization of extrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit would pay homage to 
the goal of predictability by acknowledging and granting deference to the 
lower court. 
The Federal Circuit’s conclusions can be very unpredictable when the 
claim construction is based upon extrinsic evidence. This is precisely the 
lack of predictability and uniformity that is a result of reviewing all matters 
of claim construction as questions of law with zero deference when it ap-
pears to be a mixed question of law and fact. Patent litigants may get unpre-
dictable results between the Federal Circuit and the district court, which 
increases unpredictability and lack of uniformity in patent litigation. 
 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 450–51 
(Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 137. See id. 
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B. Retractable I and Retractable II: Providing a More Thorough Look 
Separate from the use of extrinsic evidence and de novo review, this 
note now discusses the issues associated with claim construction methodol-
ogies. The court’s construction of a claim term will determine what consti-
tutes the patent and patentable rights. Retractable I held that the claim term 
“body,” which is the central part of a syringe that holds the liquid to be in-
jected, should be limited to include only “one-piece bodies” because this 
was the only construction that comported with the specifications.138 The 
court looked to the specifications and determined that because the specifica-
tions only disclosed one-piece bodies, the claim term “body” must be lim-
ited to that construction.139 However, the dissent asserted that construing a 
claim term in order to comport with the court’s view of the specification is 
erroneous and not supported by Phillips.140 The dissent argued that under the 
rules of Phillips and the doctrine of claim differentiation, the claim term 
“body” should not be limited to include only one-piece bodies but should 
also include multiple-piece bodies.141 The majority’s improper limitation of 
the claim term “body” consequently limited the rights of RTI to what the 
court considered to be the patented invention.142 
The relevant issue in Retractable I was the interpretation of the claim 
term “body” within a patent for a retractable syringe needle.143 On appeal, 
BD asserted to the Federal Circuit that the district court erred by concluding 
that the term “body” should not be limited to a one-piece body but should 
include multiple-piece bodies.144 RTI argued that even though the specifica-
tion discloses a “one-piece body,” the claim term should not be limited to 
only one-piece bodies because the claims also refer simply to “body” as well 
as “one-piece bodies.”145 The multiple usage of the term indicates that it was 
not intended to be limited to only one-piece bodies, otherwise the claims 
would only mention one-piece bodies and not include the more open, unlim-
ited term of just “body.”146 If the inventor only intended the term “body” to 
include one-piece bodies, then the claims would only reference one-piece 
bodies.147 The court’s construction of the claim term “body” ultimately de-
 
 138. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). 
 139. See id. 
 140. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 141. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 1298, 1304–05 (majority opinion). 
 144. Id. at 1304. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
 147. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
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termined what constitutes RTI’s patent, whether RTI has legal rights over 
multiple-piece bodies or just one-piece bodies of the syringes, and thus 
whether its patent was infringed upon.148 
1. The Retractable I Majority’s Holding and Reasoning That the 
Claim Term Should be Limited 
This section will look in detail at the majority holding in Retractable I 
and its improper limitation of a claim term, which resulted in the improper 
limitation of the patentee’s rights. This limitation of the patentee’s rights 
exemplifies the unpredictability in claim construction methodologies within 
the Federal Circuit. In Retractable I, the majority concluded that the specifi-
cations had to be reviewed in order to properly construe the ambiguous term 
“body” and held that the term was limited to a “one-piece body.”149 Review-
ing the exact language and written descriptions, “[t]he specifications indi-
cate that the [claim term] ‘body’ refers to a ‘one-piece body,’” and they state 
that the syringe “features a one piece hollow body.”150 The drawings and 
figures presented by the specifications delineate a syringe with a one-piece 
body and do not depict a multiple-piece body.151 There is nothing in the 
specification language to suggest that the term “body” was intended to mean 
anything other than a “one-piece body.”152 However, this does not mean that 
the specification should limit the claim term to mean only what the specifi-
cation discloses because the specification should not be used to limit a claim 
term but only to interpret a claim term.153 It is important to know what the 
specification discloses in order to understand how the majority uses it to 
limit the claim-term “body.” 
The court proclaimed to adhere to the standard rules of claim construc-
tion, as promulgated by Phillips, that claim construction requires more than 
interpreting the claim term in isolation; it must be read in view of the speci-
fication.154 The court here recited the rules of Phillips by stating that claim 
construction should not improperly import a limitation from the specifica-
tion into the claims.155 Also, the court should try to capture the scope of the 
actual invention and should not strictly limit the claim to disclosed language 
 
 148. See id. at 1304–07 (majority opinion). 
 149. See id. at 1305. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370–73 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable Techs., 653 
F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
 154. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). 
 155. See id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323). 
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or allow the claim language to become divorced from the scope of the speci-
fication.156 
In holding that the claim-term “body” should be limited to only one-
piece structures, the majority looked to the specification and concluded that 
because the specification only recites or describes one-piece bodies, the 
claim term must therefore be limited to what the specification describes.157 
According to the court, the construction of “body” must be limited to a one-
piece body because the scope of the specification that refers to a one-piece 
body limits the meaning of the term.158 The court admittedly notes that alt-
hough the claims themselves do leave open the possibility that “body” could 
mean multiple-piece bodies, the specifications direct the construction to 
encompass only “one-piece” bodies.159 The dissent and the precedential 
rules of Phillips disagree with the majority’s conclusion that purports to 
limit the claim term and thereby improperly limit the patentee’s rights.160 
2. The Dissent’s Reasoning in Retractable I and II and the Doctrine 
of Claim Differentiation 
The dissenters in Retractable I and II fundamentally disagreed with the 
majority regarding its construction of the claim term at issue.161 Using the 
rules established in Phillips, and determining “[t]he ordinary and customary 
meaning of ‘body,’” the Retractable I dissent argued that the claim term 
does not contain a one-piece limitation and neither the claim language nor 
the written description supports the notion that the inventor intended to limit 
 
 156. See id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323–24). 
 157. See id. (asserting that the term “body” must be limited to a one-piece body in order 
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 158. See id. at 1305 (the specifications only refer to one-piece bodies and thus limit the 
meaning of the claim term). 
 159. See id. (concluding that even though the claim language leaves open the possibility 
of multiple-piece bodies, the specifications guide the construction of the term to include only 
one-piece bodies). The dissent uses the doctrine of claim differentiation to show that when 
the claim language has two different meanings, dependent and independent claims, the court 
should not import a limitation from one claim term into the adjacent claim. See id. at 1312 
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 161. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370–73 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable Techs., 653 
F.3d at 1311–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
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the body to a one-piece structure.162 The ordinary meaning of the term 
“body” is clear and commonly understood, and it is not ambiguous; there-
fore, the specification is not needed in order to determine the meaning.163 
The dissent claimed that it is improper to limit the term where the meaning 
is clear and further, that it is erroneous to import a limitation from the speci-
fication in order to tether the claim to the majority view of the scope of the 
intended invention.164 Thus, the deviation from the rules of Phillips improp-
erly limited the rights of the patentee, and such deviation fosters unpredicta-
bility, because there is no way for a patent litigant, like RTI, to know when 
the Federal Circuit will adhere to precedent or deviate at its whim. 
The dissent argues that the majority also disregarded the doctrine of 
claim differentiation and the conclusion that this doctrine would have ren-
dered.165 Simply put, the doctrine of claim differentiation provides that a 
dependent claim with a particular limitation does not limit an independent 
claim.166 Specifically, “the presence of a dependent claim that adds a par-
ticular limitation gives rise to a presumption that the limitation in question is 
not present in the independent claim.”167 For example, the dependent claim 
“square laser refractor” should not limit the independent claim “laser refrac-
tor” to only include a square-shaped laser refractor. By not limiting the in-
dependent claim “laser refractor” to any particular shape, the patentee has 
purposefully not limited its invention to include only square laser refractors, 
but rather the patentee has left open the term laser refractor to include an-
other feasible shape other than square. This rule takes on particular im-
portance when one party seeks to limit the patentee’s rights by importing the 
limitation from the dependent claim into the independent claim.168 That is 
exactly the situation in this case, where BD sought to limit the term, and the 
majority does, in fact, import the limitation from the dependent claim into 
the independent claim.169 
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 163. See id. (stating that the majority should not have used the specification in the instant 
case because the meaning of the term is clear). 
 164. See id. at 1311–12 (discussing the court’s importation of limitation from the specifi-
cation, whereby the majority limits the rights of the patentee and the patented invention, 
which accordingly can lead to unpredictable and unintended consequences for the patentee). 
 165. See id. at 1312–13. 
 166. See id. at 1312 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (en banc)). 
 167. Id. (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315). 
 168. See SunRace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2003); Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 169. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
2015] BRINGING PREDICTABILITY BACK 355 
Under the claim differentiation doctrine, the court cannot import a limi-
tation from the dependent claim “one-piece” into the independent claims of 
“body.”170 A court acknowledging and applying the doctrine of claim differ-
entiation should hold that the claim term should not be limited by another 
claim term, but rather it should be viewed independently so as to encompass 
both meanings of the term.171 Properly applying the rules and analysis of 
Phillips, the court should conclude that the claim term is not limited by an-
other claim term, or by the specification, and that any such limitation placed 
upon the patentee’s rights is improper.172 Because the Federal Circuit ran-
domly defies the precedent of Phillips, patent litigants cannot predict when 
the court will adhere to Phillips, acknowledge the doctrine of claim differen-
tiation, or unpredictably distort the rules to fit the court’s own view of what 
the patent should entail. This important analysis of claim differentiation gets 
to the heart of the dissent’s opinion, that the majority improperly imported 
this limitation into the term “body” and limited the rights of RTI.173 
The doctrine of claim differentiation is sufficient to establish the proper 
construction of the term “body” even when the court reads it in light of the 
specification, because the court is not to use the specification as a limiting 
factor but alternatively, as a useful part of the intrinsic record.174 The court 
cannot use the specification to narrow a claim term or deviate from its plain 
and ordinary meaning.175 The specifications do not provide a special defini-
tion to restrict the term “body,” and although the embodiments described in 
the specifications contain one-piece bodies, that alone is an insufficient basis 
for limiting the term “body” to a one-piece.176 Here, the majority improperly 
used the specification to determine what it viewed as the scope of the actual 
invention and proceeded to limit the claim-term “body” as it deemed fit, 
while simultaneously disregarding the doctrine of claim differentiation by 
giving it only a passing nod.177 
 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 1311–13. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. at 1312–13. 
 175. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 
F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 176. Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that 
although the specifications refer to one-piece bodies, that is not dispositive and conclusive 
enough to justify limiting the claim term accordingly). 
 177. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1371–72 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable 
Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305. 
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The dissents assert that their analysis is analogous and parallel to the 
analysis in Phillips and makes clear that the majority opinion in Retractable 
I cannot be reconciled with Phillips.178 The claim construction methodology 
and holding in Retractable I are in disagreement with Phillips, and the ma-
jority erred when it imported a limitation from the specification into the 
claim term. Courts and patent litigants regard Phillips as establishing proper 
claim construction methodology, and thus, they may analyze their legal 
strategies, chances of success, patented rights, and predicted outcomes based 
upon these guidelines. When the Federal Circuit deviates from this recog-
nized methodology, lower courts and litigants cannot accurately predict the 
outcome because the Federal Circuit has misconstrued established prece-
dent, or in some instances, such as claim differentiation in Retractable I, the 
Federal Circuit has blatantly ignored it. This distortion makes patent law and 
litigation, particularly on appeal to the Federal Circuit, very unpredictable, 
and it lacks the desired uniformity concerning all involved parties.179 The 
intracircuit split in claim construction methodology introduces an element of 
unpredictability, which can have dire consequences for a patent litigant 
when the court hands down unforeseen results.180 The inconsistent and un-
predictable methodology employed by the Federal Circuit defies the goal of 
predictability and uniformity.181 One major goal in creating the Federal Cir-
cuit was to increase uniformity and consistency; however, the Federal Cir-
cuit arbitrarily juggling between methodologies undermines that goal.182 
Adhering to one specific and established methodology with consistency 
would increase the predictability of patent litigation and reduce the number 
of reversals and appeals, while promoting settlement.183 
C. A Closer Look at Phillips and a Comparison With Retractable I 
The court in Phillips clarified the guidelines of claim construction 
promulgated by past precedent, and the Federal Circuit still recognizes Phil-
lips as the standard for claim construction rules.184 In Phillips, Mr. Phillips 
brought suit against AWH Corp., alleging infringement of patent claims, 
among other claims.185 Mr. Phillips invented modular, steel-shell panels that 
 
 178. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1371–72 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable 
Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting). 
 179. See Yonker, supra note 11, at 308–09. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. at 323. 
 182. See Phillips, supra note 6, at 958–59. 
 183. See Yonker, supra note 11, at 323, 331. 
 184. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1303–05; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 
1303, 1311–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 185. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1309. 
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were designed to be impact resistant, and one component of these panels is 
the “baffle,” which was the claim term at issue in Phillips.186 Specifically, 
the panels are comprised of baffles that are described as “internal steel baf-
fles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls.”187 Here, it is more im-
portant to understand the proposed function of the panels and baffles, which 
is to be impact resistant and deflect projectiles,188 than it is to understand the 
exact appearance or demeanor of a baffle. 
Comparable to the dissent in Retractable I, the majority in Phillips 
looked to the doctrine of claim differentiation, which dictates that the pres-
ence of a dependent claim, adding a particular limitation, presumes that the 
limitation does not exist in the independent claim.189 A dependent claim that 
limits the baffle to angles that exclusively deflect projectiles, angles not 90°, 
should not limit an independent claim that does not limit the baffle to a par-
ticular angle.190 By specifying in one instance that the baffle should deflect 
projectiles does not mean that every baffle must serve that purpose and thus 
be constructed at that particular purpose-serving angle.191 Here, specific 
claims within the patent specify particular functions of the baffles, such as a 
dependent claim which states that baffles may be “oriented with the panel 
sections disposed at angles for deflecting projectiles such as bullets able to 
penetrate the steel plates.”192 
The underlying assumption here is that baffles at right angles (90°) do 
not “deflect” projectiles but rather halt motion and momentum altogether, 
and in order to deflect projectiles, the baffle must be at an angle other than 
90°. The language of a dependent claim limitation of being constructed at 
angles for deflecting projectiles (angles other than 90°) indicates that the 
patentee did not intend that the term “baffles” inherently contained that limi-
tation, otherwise to specify would be superfluous.193 If the term baffles in-
herently contained that limitation, there would be no need to specify that 
 
 186. See id. at 1309–10. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. at 1310. 
 189. See id. at 1315 (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004)) (stating the general rule of claim differentiation, which is cited and discussed in 
Retractable I). 
 190. See id. at 1324–27. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (emphasis added). 
 193. See id. (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“concluding that an independent claim should be given broader scope than a depend-
ent claim to avoid rendering the dependent claim redundant,” which is to say that a limitation 
provided by a dependent claim should not be read into an independent claim)). This is the 
general rule of claim differentiation, and Phillips states that the court has “rejected the con-
tention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be 
construed as being limited to that embodiment.” Id. at 1323 (citing Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, 
Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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particular limitation.194 The patentee included it in order to reflect the idea 
that not every baffle will serve the function of deflecting projectiles, because 
the person of ordinary skill would not understand baffles to be limited to 
angles that deflect projectiles (not 90° angles).195 Adhering to the doctrine of 
claim differentiation, the presence of the dependent claims that specify a 
particular function (deflecting projectiles) should not be imported or as-
sumed to be present in the independent claim term, “baffles.”196 Such a con-
struction would improperly limit the claim term, and thus, the patentee’s 
rights where the patentee did not intend to limit its invention or rights.197 
Looking at the role of the specification, the dissent in Phillips cited that 
the specifications themselves contained no illustrations, descriptions, or dis-
closure of baffles at right angles (90°) and there was no reference to baffles 
at right angles.198 The specifications unequivocally made clear that the baf-
fles are angled (not at right angles) and only referenced angled baffles.199 
Compare this to Retractable I where the specifications disclosed only a 
“one-piece” body, did not disclose multiple-piece bodies, and the majority 
limited the claim term to what the specification disclosed.200 However, con-
tradictory to the majority in Retractable I, the majority in Phillips declined 
to limit the claim term, “baffle,” to the disclosed specifications and instead, 
construed the term to its ordinary and plain meaning.201 This is an important 
distinction, and a perfect illustration of how the majority in Retractable I 
deviated from the analysis of Phillips. 
This analysis of claim differentiation in Phillips is analogous to the 
analysis of the dissents in Retractable I and II, in which both courts con-
cluded that the limitation of a dependent claim does not import a limitation 
 
 194. See id. at 1325 (citing TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 195. See id. at 1324–25. The court infers that the person of ordinary skill would not un-
derstand the term to include only deflecting baffles; therefore, the patentee included the limi-
tation in order to make the distinction that some baffles will serve to deflect projectiles while 
others will not. See id. This is supported in the rest of the specification and claim language, 
where baffles are described as having functions other than deflection. See id. 
 196. See id. at 1324–27 (this is the general proposition and rule abiding conclusion that 
the majority accepts). 
 197. See id. 
 198. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The dissent asserts that nothing within the specifications indicates, discloses, or illustrates 
baffles at right angles, but instead the specifications only depict baffles at angles other than 
right angles. See id. This is synonymous with the reasoning that the majority in Retractable I 
gave for deciding to limit the term “body” to one-piece bodies, because the specifications 
only depict one-piece bodies. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 
F.3d 1296, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 199. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1329 (Lourie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 200. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305. 
 201. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27. 
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into the independent claim, so that the patentee’s rights are not inappropri-
ately limited.202 Phillips stands for the notion that a claim term should not be 
limited by another claim term or the specification, and this argument is 
promulgated by the dissents in Retractable I and II.203 The patentee in Re-
tractable I likely did not predict that the Federal Circuit would bypass Phil-
lips and ignore the doctrine of claim differentiation en route to limiting the 
patentee’s rights to what the court determined was the scope of the inven-
tion. This unpredictability and deviation from precedent renders litigants, 
like the patentee in Retractable I, unable to accurately surmise what rights 
they may possess or how the Federal Circuit will construct a claim upon 
appeal. 
Reflecting back to the previous discussion of the majority holding and 
analysis in Retractable I, the court’s conclusion and reasoning disregarded 
the doctrine of claim differentiation, while also importing a limitation from 
the specification into the claim term.204 It is obvious that the Retractable I 
court dismissed, or at the very least downplayed, the doctrine of claim dif-
ferentiation, especially in comparison to Phillips.205 
In Retractable I, the court acknowledged the existence of the limiting 
dependent claim, “one-piece body,” and the independent claim, “body,” but 
declared the implication that “body” is not limited to a one-piece body is a 
weak implication.206 This assessment minimizes and overlooks the conclu-
sions drawn from the doctrine of claim differentiation, and Phillips. In con-
trast to Phillips, Retractable I held that even though “the claims leave open 
the possibility that . . . ‘body’ may encompass” multiple-piece bodies, there-
by ignoring the doctrine of claim differentiation, and determined that the 
claim-term should be limited to one-piece bodies in order to “tether the 
claims to what the specifications indicate.”207 By properly adhering to the 
analysis and guidelines established by Phillips, the majority in Retractable I 
should have concluded that the presence of this limiting dependent claim 
does not then automatically limit the independent claim, and the doctrine of 
 
 202. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371–72 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (denial of rehearing en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable Techs., 653 
F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27. 
 203. See Retractable Techs., 659 F.3d at 1371–73 (Moore, J., dissenting); Retractable 
Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312–13 (Rader, C.J., dissenting); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27. 
 204. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304–05 (holding that the claim term should be 
limited to what the dependent claim states and importing the limitation of a “one-piece” body 
from the specification because the specification only depicts one-piece bodies). 
 205. See id. (glancing over the fact that a dependent claim and an independent claim exist 
and, therefore, the dependent claim’s limitations should not be imported into the independent 
claim); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27. 
 206. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1305. This is in direct conflict with the doctrine 
of claim differentiation established in Phillips and cited by the dissent in Retractable I. 
 207. See id. 
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claim differentiation can only lead to the conclusion that the term “body” 
should not be limited to only one-piece bodies.208 As evidenced, the majority 
in Retractable I disregarded the analysis involving claim differentiation in 
reaching its conclusion, and instead, it imported a limitation from the speci-
fications, which is in direct conflict with the well-established guidelines of 
Phillips.209 
The majority in Retractable I not only declined to adhere to claim dif-
ferentiation, or give it more than a passing nod; however, it also defied the 
rules and guidelines of Phillips by improperly importing a limitation from 
the specification into the claim-term “body.”210 The specifications in Phillips 
are comparable to the specifications in Retractable I because, in both cases, 
the specifications only depict one type or version of the claim term in ques-
tion.211 Comparing the two conclusions drawn, unlike Phillips, the Retracta-
ble I court rejected the notion that if a specification describes a single em-
bodiment, as it does in both cases at hand, the claim-terms should not be 
construed as being limited to that embodiment.212 Rather than adhering to 
Phillips and declining to import a limitation from the specification, the court 
in Retractable I decided to limit the claim term in order to “tether the claims 
to what the specifications indicate[d],” and thus, limited the rights of RTI.213 
The dissents of Retractable I and II explained that the analysis and 
holding in Retractable I were incorrect, the specification cannot be used to 
narrow a claim term, and the court “cannot . . . redefine a claim term to 
match [its] view of the scope of the invention” based upon the specifica-
tion.214 According to the Retractable II dissent and its well-reasoned assess-
ment, the majority in Retractable I rewrote the claim term in order to con-
form to the court’s belief of what the scope of the invention inhabits rather 
than abiding by the doctrine of claim differentiation, the proper role of spec-
ifications, and the rules set forth by Phillips.215 
 
 208. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1312 (Rader, C.J., dissenting); Phillips, 415 F.3d 
at 1324–25. By adhering to the principles and analysis in Phillips, the court in Retractable I 
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 209. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304–05; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27. 
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 214. See Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371–72 
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This intracircuit split represents a clear disconnect and lack of uni-
formity in how the Federal Circuit conducts claim construction when there 
are both dependent and independent claims, and where the specifications 
only disclose one version of the claim-term.216 The court in Phillips adhered 
to its own rules, which are well recognized and established, while the court 
in Retractable I deviated from those rules, importing a limitation from the 
specification into the claim-term.217 This importation of a limitation upon the 
claim-term is unwarranted under Phillips, and moreover, is unpredictable. In 
order to establish more predictability and uniformity, the court must adhere 
to the well-reasoned, and well-established, guidelines set forth in Phillips. 
This intracircuit split highlights the lack of uniformity in the claim con-
struction methodology and introduces an element of risk as well as lack of 
predictability. The intracircuit split may have grave consequences for patent 
litigants because there is no uniform method of claim construction, and the 
parties are left in the dark as to how the court will construe particular claim-
terms. Unpredictability and a lack of uniformity leave patent holders, and 
patent litigants, wondering exactly what rights they may or may not procure, 
how the court will rule in a patent infringement case, and what general as-
pects of the patent are protected. Uniformity in claim construction was a 
major goal of the Federal Courts Improvement Act,218 and the Federal Cir-
cuit would take a step toward achieving that goal by adhering to the estab-
lished claim construction methodology promulgated by Phillips. A singular, 
well-defined claim construction methodology would promote settlement, 
reduce litigation, and increase the predictability and uniformity of patent 
litigation.219 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit was established, in part, to bring predictability to 
patent litigation. However, contrary to this goal, the Federal Circuit has 
achieved a reputation of being notoriously unpredictable in its patent litiga-
tion, particularly claim construction disputes. There are many proposed the-
ories explaining the causes and effects of this unpredictability. Here, the 
intracircuit split within the Federal Circuit, regarding claim construction 
methodologies, underlines and increases unpredictability and a lack of uni-
formity. The Federal Circuit in Retractable I deviated from the well-
established rules of Phillips and unnecessarily limited the claim-term 
“body,” and as a consequence, the court unexpectedly limited the patentee’s 
 
 216. See Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at 1304–05; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324–27. 
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legal rights as well. The Federal Circuit also increases unpredictability by 
reviewing matters of claim construction with extrinsic evidence as pure 
questions of law, thereby granting zero deference under de novo review, 
even though it is likely a mixed question of fact and law to which some def-
erence should be granted. This apparent unpredictability and lack of uni-
formity can lead to unforeseen results and unclear expectations. Most im-
portantly, it blurs the line on what the patentee regards as his or her rights 
over the particular patented invention. In order to help achieve the goal of 
bringing more predictability to patent litigation, the Federal Circuit should 
adhere to the claim construction guidelines established by Phillips. 
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